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A new lex mercatoria is emerging in the unification of the law of
international trade. In analyzing this development, this Article will em-
phasize two points. First, international contracts are based essentially on
national law, a feature of which is the lack of state involvement resulting
in party autonomy. A party's freedom to contract is a uniformly recog-
nized principle of contract law. Second, in recent times - particularly
following World War II - a wide range of state governmental regula-
tions have appeared which restrict parties' freedom to contract. Such
restrictions include economic regulations promulgated by the modern
state, plus considerable legislation intended to protect the rights of eco-
nomically weaker parties such as consumers and employees.1
The essence of national contract law deals with comparable objec-
tives, similar contingencies, and results in solutions which manifest a
comparative basis. This basis can provide the foundation for the revital-
ization of an ancient lex mercatoria or law of the merchant. Private law
experts of industrialized nations began this revitalization process approx-
imately sixty years ago with the establishment of the International Insti-
tute for the Unification of Private Law ("UNIDROIT").
Headquartered in Rome, UNIDROIT worked diligently to draft uniform
conventions and model legislation for the purpose of obtaining universal
codification of selected substantive and procedural laws in areas where
uniformity was essential.
Three conferences on private international law initiated a universal
unification process of the law applicable to the international sale of
goods. This unification was based on the comparative law heritage of
most Western nations.3 After more than thirty years of preparatory
work by UNIDROIT, the Hague Conference adopted two crucial con-
ventions in 1964 unifying the substantive rules of international sales con-
tracts.4 This substantive unification buttressed the prior unification of
the conflict of laws rules applicable to the international sale of goods
which the Hague Conference on Private International Law concluded in
I THE TRANSNATIONAL LAW OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 20 (C.
Schmitthoff & N. Horn eds. 1982).
2 Id. at 27.
3 Lando, Contracts, in 3 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 24-72
(1976).
4 Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, July 1, 1964, 834
U.N.T.S. 107; Convention relating to a Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods, July 1, 1964, 834 U.N.T.S. 169. For a bibliography of writings on the uniform
laws, see Bibliography, International Sale of Goods, 27 AM. J. COMI. L. 345 (1979).
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1955. 5
On October 30, 1985, after an extraordinary session held October
14-30, the Hague Conference on Private International Law adopted a
Draft Convention on the Law Applicable to Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods ("Hague Draft Convention"). 6 The new convention
will replace the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods of June 15, 1955 ("Hague Convention"),7 currently
in force in only nine states. 8 The new convention will also complement
the substantive rules of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods, concluded at Vienna on April 11, 1980
("UNCITRAL" or "Vienna Convention").9
This Article is a comparative assessment of the most recent revision
of the Hague Convention. Analysis of the new Hague Draft Convention
will focus necessarily on the earlier Hague Convention. Attention will
also be paid to the more recent Rome Contractual Obligations Conven-
tion' ° (which provides a uniform set of conflict of laws rules within the
European Economic Community), and the COMECON General Condi-
tions of Delivery of 1985 (which provides uniform substantive rules for
the international sale of goods between Soviet bloc nations).'1 The
United States position, expressed in § 1-105 of the Uniform Commercial
Code ("UCC"), will receive particular attention in the analysis of the
relevant provisions of the Hague Draft Convention.'
2
5 Convention on the Law Applicable to International Sales of Goods, June 15, 1955, 510
U.N.T.S. 147 [hereinafter 1955 Hague Convention].
6 Draft Convention on the Law Applicable to Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
Oct. 30, 1985, reprinted in 24 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1573 (1985) [hereinafter Hague Draft
Convention].
7 1955 Hague Convention, supra note 5.
8 Id. The convention entered into force on May 3, 1964, and is currently in force between:
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Niger, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. See also Hon-
nold, The Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: An Overview, 27 AM. J.
COMP. L. 223 (1979).
9 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, ST/LEG./
SER.E/4/Add. 1, reprinted in 19 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 668 (concluded at Vienna on Apr. 1I,
1980) (the convention will enter into force Jan. 1, 1988, in accordance with art. 99(1) of the Conven-
tion) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. As of Jan. 1, 1987, the following nations ratified or acceded
to the convention: Argentina, Egypt, France, Hungary, Lesotho, Syrian Arab Republic, Yugoslavia,
Zambia, China, Italy, and the United States of America.
10 Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (European Economic Commu-
nities), 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L266) (Oct. 1980) [hereinafter Rome Contractual Obligations
Convention].
II See infra note 36.
12 See generally Dore & DeFranco, A Comparison of the Non-Substantive Provisions of the UNCI-
TRAL Convention on the International Sale of Goods and the Uniform Commercial Code. 23 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 49, 52-56 (1982).
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II. RELATIONSHIP TO THE VIENNA CONVENTION
The significance of the Hague Draft Convention may be understood
best by assessing its relationship to the Vienna Convention. The major
purpose of the Vienna Convention was the achievement of a worldwide
unification of substantive law governing the international sale of goods.
The success of the Vienna Convention depends upon universal ratifica-
tion of its relevant provisions. The drafting history offers the best assur-
ance that worldwide adoption is quite likely. Previous attempts to attain
this goal failed, as exemplified by the 1964 Hague Convention. This re-
sult was due to the biased and isolated drafting process in which only the
countries of Western Europe participated. UNCITRAL was created in
1964 in order to achieve a much wider participation in the drafting pro-
cess13 and to represent a geographic and socioeconomic cross section of
the world community. UNCITRAL also reconciled major differences
between common law and civil law traditions. The Vienna Convention,
signed in 1980, has a reasonable chance of becoming a universal uniform
convention, thereby promoting legal certainty regarding the free flow of
goods across national boundaries. 4
One of the more controversial sections of the Vienna Convention
relates to the sphere of its application. More specifically, the controversy
concerns the definition of the convention's geographic scope in the light
of Article 1.15 There is a general understanding that Article l(1)(a) pro-
vides for the application of the Vienna Convention if a contract for the
sale of goods is concluded between parties whose places of business are in
different states and if the states are both signatories to the Vienna Con-
vention. This provision establishes the international character and scope
of the Vienna Convention's application which the participants adopted in
the drafting process. Subsequent signatories to the Vienna Convention
have consented to this provision regarding its scope.
16
While the signatory parties to the Vienna Convention generally un-
derstood and accepted Article l(l)(a), Article l(1)(b) raised a great deal
of controversy concerning its geographic scope and application. Article
l(l)(b) extends the application of the Vienna Convention in instances
"when the rules of private international law lead to the application of the
13 Winship, The Scope of the Vienna Convention on International Sales Contracts, in INTERNA-
TIONAL SALES: THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL
SALE OF GOODS 1-1 (N. Galston & H. Smit eds. 1984) [hereinafter INT'L SALES].
14 Dore & DeFranco, supra note 12, at 51.
15 Dore, Choice of Law Under the International Sales Convention: A US. Perspective, 77 Am. J.
INT'L L. 521, 529-36 (1983).
16 Id. at 532 n.62.
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law of a contracting state."'17 The drafters clearly intended to extend the
Vienna Convention's scope of application to a worldwide basis; Article
l(l)(b) should be viewed as an attempt to attain such an objective. The
drafters of the Vienna Convention believed that, if universal unification
of the substantive law applicable to international sales contracts could
not be achieved through worldwide ratification, the same goal could be
reached by the application of state private international law.18 Unfortu-
nately, this goal cannot be achieved unless there is some form of harmo-
nization and eventual unification of the rules of private international law.
As long as the approximately 185 members of the United Nations ex-
press their respective national sovereignty by enacting separate systems
of private international law, the Vienna Convention's reference to rules
of private international law creates more uncertainty and leads to the
unexpected application of the convention's uniform law. 9
It is not surprising that Article l(l)(b) generated a great deal of con-
troversy even in the drafting stage. Several countries expressed their in-
tention to make a reservation to the application of Article l(l)(b) as
permitted by Article 95.2' The United States took the opportunity to
make a reservation to Article l(l)(b) in its ratification of the Vienna Con-
vention,21 thereby expressing preference for the application of the UCC
or the commercial law of a foreign contracting party in the event such
party comes from a nonratifying state. Many other countries may follow
the United States lead in expressing a reservation to Article l(l)(b). If
this occurs, it will limit the Vienna Convention's geographic scope of
application and consequently undermine the success of the unification of
the law applicable to international sales contracts."2 The question re-
mains whether legal certainty and security can be balanced with the ob-
jective of universal unification of international sales law.
III. A COMPARATIVE LAW ASSESSMENT OF UNIFICATION
The most reasonable approach to resolving the dilemma presented
17 Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. l(l)(b).
18 Dore, supra note 15, at 541.
19 Dore & DeFranco, supra note 12, at 55.
20 Id.
21 See supra note 9, an addendum to which provides that: in connection with the 1980 Conven-
tion on Contracts for Int'l Sale of Goods, the United Nations received: Approval by China with a
declaration that China does not consider itself bound by sub-para. (b) of para. 1 of art. I, and art. II,
as well as the provisions in the convention relating to the content of art. II; ratification by Italy; and
ratification by the United States with a declaration that it will not be bound by sub-para. (l)(b) of
art. I. As the entry into force conditions are now fulfilled, the convention will enter into force on
Jan. 1, 1988, in accordance with art. 99(1).
22 Dore & DeFranco, supra note 11, at 55-56.
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by Article l(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention is to extend its scope of ap-
plication while attempting to achieve a sense of predictability and legal
certainty. Such an approach raises the issue of divergent state rules of
private international law governing international sales contracts.23 A
comparative survey of selected national systems shows a reasonable basis
for harmonization and eventual unification of these conflicting rules.
A common core of rules governing international sales contracts can
be traced to the legal heritage of most nations. This common core is
based on the universal recognition of party autonomy: that contracting
parties should enjoy the freedom to draft private contracts, selecting the
substantive law of a national legal system to fill in gaps.24 Party auton-
omy provides the best safeguard for protecting the parties' expectations
and creating a universally recognized form of legal certainty in transac-
tions cutting across national boundaries. Only the scope of parties' free-
dom to choose the applicable law and the limitation on this choice
present a comparative law problem as national legal systems have certain
well-defined differences in this regard.25 Thus, unification of private in-
ternational law governing international sales contracts should be based
on the recognition of party autonomy. Such an approach has been taken
by most of the national and international codifications of the law.26
If parties do not choose the applicable law for a contract, state pri-
vate international law systems offer a variety of solutions. Traditionally,
courts used objective, well-defined connecting factors to make choice of
law decisions for parties which had failed to do so.27 The most widely
accepted factors were the place of contracting and the place of perform-
ance.28 These rules provided the essential criteria of easy application, a
23 Lando, supra note 3, at 39.
24 Id.
25 2 E. RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 359-95 (1960).
26 Id. at 370-86; see also Note, Effectiveness of Choice-of-Law Clauses in Contract Conflicts of
Law. Party Autonomy or Objective Determination? 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1659 (1982) (an interesting
analytical approach opposing party autonomy).
27 2 E. RABEL, supra note 25, at 447-64.
28 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332 (1934) [hereinafter FIRST RESTATE-
MENT]. Section 332 provides, in pertinent part:
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sense of legal certainty, predictability, and uniformity.2 9 At the same
time, however, essential interests of contracting parties, the concern of
the involved states, and a reasonable judicial reference to national con-
tract laws were somewhat disregarded.3 ° Thus, there was a movement
toward replacing these traditional mechanical choice of law rules with
more flexible, policy-oriented rules. This modem treatment of choice of
law stems from a better understanding of parties' interests in interna-
tional sales transactions.3 1
The position of contracting parties has come to be viewed in a con-
textual setting which places a greater reliance on the essential function of
the transaction. Performance of contracts has been found to be the cru-
cial and essential element of international sales transactions. The Swiss
Federal Tribunals have developed a practical and convenient choice of
law system, focusing on the performance of sellers who have the more
demanding, more complex, and less precise obligations in performing a
LAW GOVERNING VALIDITY OF CONTRACT.
The law of the place of contracting determines the validity and effect of a promise with
respect to
(a) capacity to make the contract;
(b) the necessary form, if any, in which the promise must be made;
(c) the mutual assent or consideration, if any, required to make a promise binding;
(d) any other requirements for making a promise binding;
(e) fraud, illegality, or any other circumstance which make a promise void or voidable;
(f) except as stated in § 358, the nature and extent of the duty for the performance of
which a party becomes bound;
(g) the time when and the place where the promise is by its terms to be performed;
(h) the absolute or conditional character of the promise.
Section 358 provides, in pertinent part:
LAW GOVERNING PERFORMANCE.
The duty for the performance of which a party to a contract is bound will be discharged by
compliance with the law of the place of performance of the promise with respect to
(a) the manner of performance;
(b) the time and locality of performance;
(c) the person or persons by whom or to whom performance shall be made or rendered;
(d) the sufficiency of performance;
(e) excuse for non-performance.
29 For a comprehensive analysis, see Audit, A Continental Lawyer Looks at Contemporary Amer-
ican Choice of Law Principles, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 589 (1979) (followed by Comments by von Meh-
ren and Juenger).
30 Id. at 595-98.
31 See generally Currie, The Verdict of Quiescent Years, 28 U. ClI. L. REV. 258 (1961); Currie,
Conflict, Crisis and Confusion in New York, 1963 DUKE L.J. 1; see also 3 A. EHRENZWEIG & E.
JAYME, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (SPECIAL PART) (1977); Kegel, Paternal Home and Dream
Home: Traditional Conflict of Laws and the American Reformers, 27 AM. J. COMp. L. 615 (1979);
Nadelmann, Impressionism and Unification of Law: The EEC Draft Convention on the Law Applica-
ble to Contractual and Non-Contractual Obligations, 24 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1976). But see Zweigert,
Some Reflections on the Sociological Dimensions of Private International Law or What is Justice in the
Conflict of Laws?, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 283 (1973) (German version entitled ZurArmut des interna-
tionalen Privatrechts an sozialen Werten, 37 RABELSZEITSCHRIFT [RabelsZ] 435 (1973)).
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contract.32 In typical international sales contracts, sellers generally have
a more complicated and less precise range of obligations, while buyers
need only fulfill a pecuniary or monetary obligation in the course of per-
formance. Several national codifications have recognized this dichotomy
in international sales contracts.33
In a major regional unification of conflict of laws rules applicable to
contracts, the Rome Contractual Obligations Convention 34 adopted this
dichotomy between the performance of the two contracting parties in
typical bilateral international sales contracts. Therefore, with respect to
the Rome Contractual Obligations Convention, it is safe to conclude that
the law of the seller's state would be viewed as determinative of the most
characteristic performance.35 Based on the empirical experience of the
Swiss Federal Tribunals, the drafters of the Rome Contractual Obliga-
tions Convention, in Article 4, applied their own choice of law rules deal-
ing with contracts. This solution is comparable to several national
codifications, chiefly the Polish, Hungarian, Czechoslovakian, and most
recent Austrian codification of private international law.36
32 Lipstein, Characteristic Performance-A New Concept in the Conflict of Laws in Matters of
Contract for the EEC, 3 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 402, 406-07 (1981).
33 Id. at 411-13.
34 Rome Contractual Obligations Convention, supra note 10.
35 Williams, The EEC Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 35 INT'L
COMP. L. 1 (1986).
36 A Swiss Draft was published in 10 BOTSCHAFT zuM BUNDESGESETZ OBER DAS INTER-
NATIONALE PRIVATRECHT, November 1982, BBI 82.072; the West German Draft was published in
5 Praxis des Internationalen Privat-und Verfahrensrecht [IPRax] (1983); and the Austrian Federal
Statute on Private International Law was published in BUNDESGESETZ, vom. 15. Juni 1978 iiber das
internationale Privatrecht, Bundesgesetzblatt No. 304 (1978) (translated in 28 AM. J. COMP. L. 222-
34 (1980); see also Palmer, The Austrian Codiication of Conflicts Law, 28 AM. J. COMP. L. 197
(1980)).
For the People's Republic of Hungary, see: A Magyar N~pk6ztArssfig Eln6ki Tanfcsinak
1979. 6vi 13. szAm6 tdrv~nyerejii rendelete a nemzetk~zi maginjogr6l (Law-Decree No. 13 of the
Presidential Council of the Hungarian People's Republic on Private International Law), 33 MAG-
YAR KOzL6NY 495. The code is published in English in 55 TUL. L. REV. 88 (1980). See also Gabor,
A Socialist Approach to Codification of Private International Law in Hungary: Comments and Trans-
lation, TUL. L. REV. 63 (1980).
For the Soviet Union, see Law of Dec. 8, 1961, Fundamental Principles of Civil Legislation of
the USSR and of the Union Republics § 18, VEDOMOsTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA [VED. VERKH.
SoV.] S.S.S.R. item no. 525; Law of June 27, 1968, Fundamental Principles of Legislation of the
USSR and of the Union Republics on Marriage and the Family § 8, VED. VERKH. SoV. S.S.S.R. (see
also Gabor & Mavi, Harmonization of Private International Law in Soviet Union and Eastern Eu-
rope; Comparative Law Survey, 10 REV. SOCIALIST L. (1984)); for Czechoslovakia, see CODE OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE (discussed in Glos, The Czechoslovak Law of Sale, 4 REV. SOcIALIsT L.
107 (1978)); for Poland, see Law of Nov. 12, 1965, Concerning Private International Law, DZIEN-
NIK USTAWV POLSKIEJ RZECRYPOSPOLITEJ LUDOWEJ [DU] No. 46, item 290 (discussed in Lasok,
The Polish System of Private International Law, 15 AM. J. COMP. L. 330 (1967); for the German
Democratic Republic, see Law of Dec. 5, 1975, [1975] GESETZBLATT DER DDR [GBI.DDR] I 748
(discussed in Juenger, The Conflicts Statute of the German Democratic Republic: An Introduction
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IV. THE CORE PROVISIONS OF THE DRAFT CONVENTION
A. Scope of the Convention
Chapter 1 (Articles 1-6) defines the scope of the Hague Draft Con-
vention.3 7 The relationship of the Vienna Convention to the Hague
Draft Convention is apparent in this chapter's articles. The drafters of
the new convention attempted to supplement UNCITRAL's provisions
by providing uniform and clearly defined choice of law rules with compa-
rable geographic applications.38 The international character of a sales
contract is determined by reference to the contracting parties' respective
places of business, which must be in different states.3 9 This criterion en-
countered practically no opposition and it is entirely compatible with the
criteria set out in the Vienna Convention for determining the interna-
tional character of a sales contract.
In contrast, Article l(b) caused controversy in the drafting pro-
cess.' The reason for the dispute is that the provisions extend the appli-
cation of the Hague Draft Convention to all other cases involving a
choice between the laws of different states, unless such a choice arises
solely from a stipulation by the parties as to the applicable law, even if
accompanied by a choice of court or arbitration. Several delegations
moved to delete this section as an unreasonable extension of the scope of
application.4" Representatives criticized Article l(b) as creating uncer-
tainty and deviating from the Vienna Convention's scope of application.
The majority of the delegates, however, disagreed and relied on Article
l(b) to cover all other possible situations in which parties have their re-
spective business establishments in different states. To omit this alterna-
tive would undermine the effective and broad application of both the
Vienna Convention and the supplementary Hague Draft Convention.42
Finally, Article 6, which provides that, "[t]he law determined under the
convention applies whether or not it is the law of a contracting state,"
may be viewed as a logical consequence of extending the scope of applica-
and Translation, 25 AM. J. COMP. L. 332 (1977). See generally F. MADL, FOREIGN TRADE MONOP-
OLY-PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 5-3 (1967); Roman, Socialist Conflict of Laws Rules and Prac-
tice in East-West Trade Contracts, 7 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1113 (1975).
37 For the authentic English text, see 24 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1573.
38 The drafting history of this chapter clearly discloses a strong effort to reconcile it with the
comparable provisions of the Vienna Convention. See Hague Conference on Private International
Law, Plenary Session, Minutes Nos. 1-3 (Oct. 1985); Hague Conference on Private International
Law, Extraordinary Session, Minutes Nos. 1-3 of Commission I (Oct. 1985) [hereinafter Hague Con-
ference Minutes].
39 Winship, supra note 13, at 1-17 to 1-20.





tion of the convention in Article L"
Generally, the drafting parties agreed that the material scope of the
Hague Draft Convention should be comparable to the Vienna Conven-
tion. Thus, the most important subject, consumer sales transactions, was
excluded. The parties agreed to avoid jeopardizing the adoption of the
new convention by attempting to include this topic. In consumer sales
transactions, each nation has developed its own protective legislation. A
compromise in this area could not be reached easily, therefore, this topic
was left for the drafting of a separate convention specifically to cover
these transactions."
B. Choice of Law Provisions
Chapter 2 of the Convention (Articles 7-13) constitutes the heart of
the Hague Draft Convention and provides for a determination of the ap-
plicable law by the parties or by the potential forum. 4' Through these
provisions the drafters attempted to overcome the essential weakness of
the 1955 Hague Convention which involved different conceptions of con-
flict of laws rules within various legal systems. According to one school
of thought, if parties have not chosen an applicable law, an objective con-
necting factor must be ascertained to determine the choice of law.46 Al-
ternatively, a judge has the authority to evaluate each case individually
and determine, in accordance with flexible criteria, which state's law
should apply to the parties' relationship.
In the absence of choice of law by the parties, a judge will analyze
various elements of the contract and the negotiations in order to discover
the intention of the parties or determine which legal system has the clos-
est or most significant relationship to the transaction. Sometimes, a
judge will try to ascertain which state has the greatest interest in apply-
ing its law to a given situation.47 The Hague Draft Convention attempts
43 Id.
44 M. PELICHET, REPORT ON THE LAW APPLICABLE TO INTERNATIONAL SALES OF GOODS 85-
91 (Prel. Doc. No. 1, Sept. 1982).
45 Hague Draft Convention, supra note 6, arts. 7-13; for a comprehensive discussion of choice of
law by the parties, see 3 E. RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 51-93
(1964).
46 E.g., Obshchie usloviia postavok tovarov mezhdu organizatsiiani Stran-Chlenov SEV (Gen-
eral Conditions for the Delivery of Goods Between Organizations of Member Countries of the Coun-
cil for Mutual Economic Assistance) § 110 (1968), in I SBORNIK NORMATIVNYKH MATERIALOV
VOPROSAM VNESHNEI TORGOVLI S.S.S.R. (SELECTED DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN
TRADE OF THE U.S.S.R.) 217 (1970) (recent revision in 1984) [hereinafter Delivery Conditions
§ 110]; Rome Contractual Obligations Convention, supra note 10, arts. 3-4; Hague Convention of
1955, § 3. See also supra note 36.
47 M. PELICHET, supra note 44, at 105-08.
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to build a bridge between the two opposing views of contemporary choice
of law rules. The resulting compromise is reflected in Articles 7 and 8
which are the core provisions for making choice of law determinations.48
1. Freedom of Choice
Party autonomy is universally recognized today as a principle of pri-
vate international law. This principle is reflected in Article 7(1) of the
Hague Draft Convention which provides that:
A contract of sale is governed by the law chosen by the parties. The parties'
agreement on this choice must be expressed or be clearly demonstrated by
the terms of the contract and the conduct of the parties, viewed in their
entirety. Such a choice may be limited to a part of the contract.
49
This threshold provision allows the parties complete freedom to choose
the law applicable to their contract. At the outset, this article manifests
the prevailing trend in the civil law countries. The same freedom can be
found in Article 1(1) of the Rome Contractual Obligations Convention 5°
and several recent national codifications. 1
There are two alternative requirements in drafting the criteria for a
proper choice of law provision. First, the choice of law should preferably
be made expressly in the contract. Second, as an alternative, an implied
choice of law by the parties is acceptable under the convention. 2 The
proper definition and the specific criteria for the implied choice of law
alternative created much controversy in the drafting process. Several
delegates tried to limit the definition of an implied choice of law while
others argued for the complete deletion of this alternative.
The Hague Draft Convention reflects a compromise comparable to
Article 3(1) of the Rome Contractual Obligations Convention which re-
lies on the terms of the contract and the conduct of the parties and views
these two factors in their entirety. The restrictive drafting of the criteria
for implied choice of law represented an attempt by the drafters to en-
hance security for party autonomy in transnational contracts.53 Article
3(1) of the Rome Contractual Obligations Convention provides a slightly
more flexible approach for the assessment of the parties' implied choice
of law, stating that this implied choice must be demonstrated with rea-
sonable certainty by the terms of the contract or the circumstances of the
48 Id.
49 Hague Draft Convention, supra note 6, art. 7(1).
50 See also Rome Contractual Obligations Convention, supra note 10, art. 3(1).
51 See supra note 36.







In light of the ratification of the convention by the United States, a
brief comparative analysis of the convention with § 1-105 of the UCC is
warranted. The UCC recognizes the implied choice of law by the parties.
Section 1-201 defines "agreement" as "the bargain of the parties in fact
as found in their language or by implication from other circumstances,
including course of dealing, or usage of trade, or course of performance
as provided under the U.C.C."5 The UCC provides for a greater and
more flexible recognition of implicit choice of law by the parties. While
§ 1-105 clearly recognizes parties' freedom in choosing applicable law,
the section also imposes a unique limitation by requiring a "reasonable
relation" to the transaction. 6 Thus, § 1-105 codifies a two-tier test.
First, the parties must agree on the governing law. Second, their transac-
tion must bear a reasonable relation to the chosen law. The Official
Comment to § 1-105 does not define the term "reasonable relation.""7
Subsequent case law has identified a number of relevant factors to be
considered in determining whether a relation is reasonable. These in-
clude the location of the signing of the contract," the parties' principal
places of business,59 the place where the greater part of performance oc-
curred or was to have occurred,60 and the location of any property sub-
54 See Rome Contractual Obligations Convention, supra note 10, art. 3(1).
55 U.C.C. § 1-201(3).
56 Dore & DeFranco, supra note 12, at 52-55.
57 Id. at 54.
58 Structural Dyn. Res. Corp. v. Engineering Mech. Res. Corp., 401 F. Supp. 1102 (E.D. Mich.
1975). The reliance on the place of contracting obviously reflects the First Restatement approach to
choice of law adopted by Michigan. The District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
reached the opposite result under a modern approach where the parties executed the underlying
contract in Georgia by a California corporation's sales agent located in Georgia. The merchandise
was delivered to a Georgia corporation in that state and was located in a Georgia warehouse. The
only contacts with California were the mailing and depositing of checks in the California bank ac-
count of the California corporation. According to the district court, that the parties executed the
contract in California was not sufficient to warrant application of California law to the transaction.
Eldon Indus., Inc. v. Paradies & Co., 397 F. Supp. 535 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
59 Mostek Corp. v. Chemetron Corp., 642 S.W.2d 20 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982); Walker v. Associates
Fin. Serv. Corp., 588 S.W.2d 416 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979)(out of state lender can stipulate to the laws
of the state in which lender is licensed and regulated).
60 Cities Serv. Co. v. Gardinier, Inc., 344 A.2d 254 (Del. Super. Ct. 1975). In Icelandic Airlines,
Inc. (Loftleidir) v. Canadair, Ltd., 104 Misc.2d 239, 428 N.Y.S.2d 393 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980), a New
York Supreme Court addressed a truly transnational fact pattern. A foreign air carrier sued a Cana-
dian manufacturer of aircraft, a New York manufacturer of an allegedly defective hydraulic control
valve, and a firm which overhauled the valve. The plaintiff brought suit on theories of negligence,
strict products liability, and breach of warranty to recover for the loss of an aircraft which crashed in
Bangladesh. The court held that the substantive law of Quebec, Canada governed because the only
contact with New York was the location of the valve manufacturer. In contrast, the valve specifica-
tions were prepared in Canada, the valve was installed there, and the aircraft purchase agreement
stated that the agreement was to be governed by Quebec law.
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ject to the contract.61 In contrast, Article 7(1) of the Hague Draft
Convention places no additional limitations or restrictions on the parties'
freedom to choose the applicable law.
Article 7(1) is even more flexible than the comparable provision of
the Rome Contractual Obligations Convention. That convention con-
tains a crucial limitation on the parties' freedom by referring to foreign
"International Mandatory Rules.",62 Articles 17 and 18 refer to both the
traditional negative and the more recent positive form of public policy of
the forum state as exercising control over the parties' choice of law free-
dom.63 In § 1-105 of the UCC there is no direct reference to a limitation
on choice of law freedom apart from the reasonable relationship require-
ment. However, such a reference is present in the general conflicts of law
principles contained in § 337 of the Restatement First on Conflict of
Laws and the comparable § 187 of the Restatement Second."4 The pre-
vailing United States approach recognized by the courts clearly provides
a defense and escape from the parties' choice of law provisions based on
the "fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest
than the chosen state.., and which.., would be the state of the applica-
ble law in the absence of choice of law by the parties."65
Following generally recognized international practice, the Hague
Draft Convention provides the freedom to choose the applicable law cov-
ering all or part of a contract.66 Additional liberal provisions may be
found in Article 7(2) which permits the contracting parties to exercise
autonomy at any time, even during the course of litigation, as long as this
would not prejudice the form or validity of the contract or the rights of a
third party.6 7
2. Applicable Law in the Absence of an Exercised Choice
If parties to an international sales contract have not exercised their
choice of law freedom, what law will a judge or arbitrator apply? In
other words, what criteria will be used to connect an international sales
contract to the law of a particular national legal system? The answer to
this question, supplied by case law and statutes of different states, varies
61 See, e.g., Tenn. Carolina Transp., Inc. v. Strick Corp., 16 N.C. App. 498, 192 S.E.2d 702,
rev'd on other grounds, 283 N.C. 423, 196 S.E.2d 711 (1972).
62 Rome Contractual Obligations Convention, supra note 10, art. 7.
63 Hague Draft Convention, supra note 6, arts. 17-18.
64 FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 27, § 337; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 187 (1971) [hereinafter SECOND RESTATEMENT].
65 SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 64, § 187 & Reporter's Note to Comment g.
66 Hague Draft Convention, supra note 6, art. 7(1).
67 Id. § 7(2).
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considerably. The answers range from the adoption of a single determi-
native connecting factor to the more flexible alternative of weighing the
interests of the parties according to the content of the applicable laws.68
It is not surprising that the attempt to reach a compromise in this
area proved difficult for the drafters. Two levels of potential conflict had
to be reconciled. First, the socioeconomic interests of different countries
had to be understood and taken into account in the drafting process. In
this first joint undertaking of UNCITRAL and the Hague Conference
there was a movement favoring a systematic application of the law of
developing countries, regardless of the type and mode of contracts. Sup-
porters of this movement considered the law of the buyer's state to be the
law of the weaker party.6 9 The tendency favoring the law of the buyer's
state is reflected clearly in several crucial provisions of the recent Vienna
Convention and the Hague Draft Convention. The socialist countries of
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union supported this position. 70 A com-
promise with this position is apparent in the complex sections of Article
8. It remains to be seen whether this compromise will be accepted in the
course of the convention's final adoption.71
A more critical interest lies at the heart of Article 8. This interest is
to find simple and clear rules which may be easily understood and used
by merchants in international trade.72 The drafters had to rely on the
respective national heritages of the participating countries, each of which
reflected divergent national solutions and approaches. There are two ma-
jor schools of thought in which to determine the applicable choice of law
rules: the Universalist and Particularist.73 The Universalist position
holds that conflicts rules should be framed to secure uniform results.
The same conflicts rules should be applied to the same matter regardless
of which state asserts jurisdiction. In order to achieve this uniformity,
writers have attempted to formulate multilateral conflict of laws rules
based on connecting factors giving foreign law and lex fori equal stand-
ing. In other words, uniformity is to be reached through equality.
The Particularist view holds that conflict rules should be framed in
close harmony with the substantive law rules and general policies of fo-
68 M. PELICHET, supra note 44, at 119.
69 Id. at 121.
70 1. SzAsz, UNIFORM LAW OF INTERNATIONAL SALES 351-60 (1982).
71 Na6n, The UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, in 2 STUDIES IN
TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 101-05 (N. Horn & C. Schmitthoff eds. 1982).
72 Id. at 100-01.
73 Lando, New American Choice-of-Law Principles and the European Conflict of Laws of Con-
tracts, 30 Am. J. COMP. L. 19, 24-31 (1982). The Universalist endeavor has prevailed in the Hague
Conferences.
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rum states. The conflict rules of the forum state are part of the law of the
state and should serve its policies. The social policies of the forum state
should direct the application of its laws and determine the applicability
of foreign law. Uniformity and equality are only secondary objectives in
conflict of laws cases. The majority of authors, legislatures, and courts
accept this point of view.
The Universalist approach has prevailed at the Hague Conferences.
A threshold compromise is manifested in Article 8 of the Hague Draft
Convention which attempts to reconcile conflicting objectives. These
provisions support Universalist ideology favoring the socioeconomic in-
terests of the potentially economically weaker party while, at the same
time, providing well-defined choice of law rules.74 To place the contro-
versial and complex Article 8 in proper perspective, it is useful to make a
brief comparative law assessment of similar choice of law solutions in
national and international legislation."
A diminishing number of writers and courts of several states con-
sider the place of final acceptance of the contract to be the most justifi-
able connecting factor.76 In support of this factor, it has been argued
that the law of the state in which the contract was created is the more
accessible forum for the parties. However, the favor accorded the lex loci
contractus has been increasingly criticized. The place of conclusion of
the contract is often fortuitous and bears no relation to the interests of
the contracting parties. Merchants frequently meet to sign a contract in
a neutral place, one which bears no relation to the places of business of
the seller or buyer. Another difficulty arises when a contract is con-
cluded over the telephone between parties who do not actually meet. In
such cases it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine where the parties
concluded the contract.77
While some jurisdictions continue to apply the lex loci contractus
standard, it has been rejected in many states in favor of a connecting
factor both more precise and relevant to international sales contracts.
This approach focuses on the law of the place of residence or domicile of
the seller.78 The adoption of this connecting factor resulted from the
creation of more precise conflicts rules emphasizing the nature of each
party's contractual obligations, chiefly the law of the place of perform-
ance or place of characteristic performance.
74 M. PELICHET, supra note 44, at 123.
75 See supra note 36.
76 FIRsT RESTATEMENT, supra note 28, § 337.
77 See supra note 36.
78 M. PELICHET, supra note 44, at 125-29.
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Before discussing the adoption of the law of the seller's state as a
connecting factor, it should be mentioned that Article 3(1) of the 1955
Hague Convention states that, in the absence of a choice by the parties,
"a sale shall be governed by the domestic law of the country in which the
vendor has his habitual residence at the time when he receives the or-
der."'79 Several recent national codifications also follow this reasoning. 0
The law of the seller's state is imposed indirectly in the General Condi-
tions of Delivery of Goods between organizations of COMECON mem-
ber countries.81 The law of the seller's state as a connecting factor has
been indirectly adopted in other codifications, both national and interna-
tional,82 and in the case law of several countries through the application
of the law dictated by the contract's center of gravity or place of
performance.83
The Swiss Federal Tribunal developed the concept of the place of
characteristic performance as the general conflicts rule for contracts. In
order to provide more concrete rules, the tribunal attempted to define the
"place of characteristic performance" for four different types of con-
tracts. The tribunal decided that, for a sale, the place of characteristic
performance was the residence of the seller; therefore, the law of the
seller's habitual state of residence should be applied to the contract.84
The Rome Contractual Obligations Convention basically adopted the
79 See 1955 Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 3.
80 See supra note 36.
81 Delivery Conditions § 110, supra note 46. See also I. SzAsz, supra note 70, at 378. The
general conditions only apply to intrabloc trading among the members of COMECON. Foreign
trade with non-socialist countries is governed by each country's private international choice of law
rules. For example, the Soviet legislation includes two conflict of laws rules relating to international
sale of goods: A rule relating to export trade calls for the application of the law of the contract (art.
126 of the Fundamental Principles of Civil Legislation), while commerce between member countries
is governed by the law of the seller.
82 M. PELICHET, supra note 44, at 127.
83 Id. at 129.
84 This concept comes from Swiss law, where it was developed by Schnitzer and the case law of
the Swiss Federal Tribunals. For a discussion of the Swiss doctrine of characteristic performance,
see I A. SCHNITZER, HANDBUCH DES INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHTS 52 and 2 A. SCHNITZER
639 (1957-58); F. VISCHER, INTERNATIONALES VERTRAGSRECHT. DIE KOLLISIONSRECHTLICHEN
REGELN DER ANKNUPFUNG BE! INTERNATIONALEN VERTRAGEN 108 (1962) [hereinafter INTER-
NATIONALES VERTRAGSRECHT]; Vischer, The Antagonism between Legal Security and the Search of
Justice in the Field of Contracts, 142 REC. COURs 3, 58 (1974). According to Vischer the law appli-
cable under the principle of characteristic performance is the law of "social order of which the
economical or sociologically most essential obligation is carried out." INTERNATIONALES VER-
TRAGSRECHT, supra, at 108. See also Law Dec. 4, 1963, Concerning Private International Law and
the Rules of Procedure Relating thereto § 9, [1963] Sbirka zakkonfi [Sb.z.] No. 7 (Czech.), and
Austrian statute of 1978, art. 36. In the absence of a contractual choice, both statutes specify the
applicable law in accordance with the principle of characteristic performance. See also Swiss draft of
1978, supra note 35, arts. 120-21.
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Swiss method of localizing international sales contracts even though it
does not deal with particular types of contracts.85
C. The Heart of the Convention: Article 8
Article 8 reflects an uneasy compromise reached in the course of
extensive debates among the drafters. It is important to understand the
conflicting interests reconciled in the course of drafting Article 8.86
Notwithstanding this conflict, there was relatively little disagreement on
the drafting of Article 8(1), which provides that:
To the extent that the law applicable to a contract of sale has not been
chosen by the parties in accordance with Article 7, the contract is governed
by the law of the state where the seller has his place of business at the time
of completion of the contract.87
The wording of this article expresses a clear preference for choice of law
by the parties. 8 Contracting parties in a transnational contract look for
a simple understanding and uniform solution to determine all aspects of
the contractual relationship. Obviously, the best solution for this objec-
tive lies in the clear expression of the parties' autonomy by stipulating the
law applicable to their contractual undertaking.
In the absence of choice of law by the parties, the overwhelming
majority of national and international solutions point to the law of the
85 Rome Contractual Obligations Convention, supra note 10, art. 4. Study of the draft reports of
this convention reveals that the law of the seller must be considered as the law of the party who has
the characteristic performance in an international sales contract. The reporters emphasized that the
party who has the more precise and simpler obligation is the buyer who only has a monetary obliga-
tion in the form of paying the purchase price or opening a letter of credit for the particular interna-
tional sales transaction. This solution of the Rome Contractual Obligations Convention greatly
simplifies the problem of determining the law applicable to a contract in the absence of choice by the
parties. The place where the act was done becomes irrelevant. There is no longer any need to
determine where the contract was concluded with all of the difficulties and problems of classification
which that entails. Determining the place or places of performance and classifying them becomes
irrelevant for each category of contract as it is the characteristic performance that is the relevant
factor in determining the applicable law.
86 Hague Conference Minutes No. 7 of Commission I.
87 Hague Draft Convention, supra note 6, art. 8(1).
88 Hague Conference Minutes No. 6 of Commission I. There was relatively little discussion on
the drafting of art. 8, q 1. The major controversy centered around the precise and effective definition
of the principal place of business of the seller. The French delegate argued that the reference to the
principal place of business of the seller could present practical problems in the case of multinational
corporations which are operating subsidiary companies in many different countries. In the final
draft, the principal place of business was changed and there was only reference to the place of the
business of the seller as part of art. 8 choice of law rules. At the same time, art. 14(1) of the conven-
tion provided a solution for the case when contracting parties have more than one place of business.
In this case the reference shall be made to the "place of business ... which has the closest relation-
ship to the contract and its performance, having regard to the circumstances known to or contem-
plated by the parties at any time before or at the conclusion of the contract." Hague Draft
Convention, supra note 6, art. 14(l).
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seller's state - in this instance, the law of the seller's principal place of
business.89 The rationale for this choice of law rule lies in the legal and
socioeconomic foundations of the international sales contract.90 In a typ-
ical case, the seller bears the more complex and demanding performance
in the transaction. The seller's range of obligations are, in relative terms,
less precisely defined. Moreover, the seller is faced with more uncer-
tainty in the transnational environment in the course of fulfilling contrac-
tual obligations. Therefore, the seller's reliance on the seller's own legal
system to govern all aspects of the transnational contract contributes a
great deal toward certainty, uniformity, and a sense of legal security.91
This basic rationale was well understood by the drafters of the conven-
tion and received almost unanimous adoption. 92 Yet, the travaux
prdparatoire disclosed a great deal of diversity and differences of opinion
in drafting the exceptions to the general premise of Article 8(1). 93
The exceptions to the basic premise of referring to the law of the
seller's state form the core of the convention. The exceptions are so ex-
tensive that, for all practical purposes, they nearly dismantle the basic
principle of reference to the law of the seller's state. 94 The major shift
from the law of the seller's state to the application of the law of the
buyer's state is found in Article 8(2). This provision states that:
[T]he contract is governed by the law of the State where the buyer has his
place of business at the time of conclusion of the contract, if -
(a) negotiations were conducted, and the contract concluded by and in
the presence of the parties, in that State; or
(b) the contract provides expressly that the seller must perform his
obligation to deliver the goods in that State; or
(c) the contract was concluded on terms determined mainly by the
buyer and in response to an invitation directed by the buyer to persons
invited to bid (a call for tenders).95
The three major exceptions in Article 8(2) reflect the legal and so-
cioeconomic interests of buyers in international sales transactions. It is
not surprising that most developing countries supported these exceptions
for purposes of restoring the balance in favor of the potentially, economi-
cally weaker buyers.96 The first exception was submitted by Mr. Wang
89 M. PELICHET, supra note 44, at 139-45; see also Jaffey, The English Proper Law Doctrine and
the EEC Convention, 33 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 531 (1984).
90 2 E. RABEL, supra note 25, at 439-47.
91 Lipstein, supra note 32, at 402-05.
92 M. PELICHET, supra note 44, at 141-43.
93 Hague Convention Minutes Nos. 7-9.
94 Hague Draft Convention, supra note 6, arts. 8(2)-8(5); a step-by-step approach undermines
the emphasis on the application of the law of the seller in the international sales contracts.
95 Id. art. 8(2).
96 Hague Convention Minutes Nos. 5-10.
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Zhenpu, the delegate representing the People's Republic of China. The
essence of his proposal received a wide range of support from other dele-
gates.97 It is easily understood that, if a seller enters into a buyer's legal
sphere of interest and takes steps in initiation, negotiation, and finaliza-
tion of the transaction in the buyer's state, such actions would shift the
transaction's center of gravity to the buyer's state and would justify the
application of the law of the buyer's state. 98
The major controversy surrounded the proper drafting of this sub-
section to ensure a sense of certainty and clarity for the merchants of the
world.99 Some delegates raised doubts regarding the exact geographic
location of negotiation and conclusion of complex international sales
contracts when telex, telephone, and other electronic devices are utilized
widely in negotiation and finalization of international sales transac-
tions."°° The negotiations for formation of an international sales con-
tract might take place in different countries in different phases and steps.
Thus, the drafters of the convention believed it essential to localize all the
negotiations in the country of the buyer and supplement this criteria with
a second condition that the contract also be concluded in the country of
the buyer by and in the presence of the parties in order to justify the
application of the law of the buyer's state.
Another uncertainty arises regarding the conclusion of the contract.
This difficulty was emphasized by several delegates. There are diverse
private international law approaches to defining and localizing the place
of completion of international sales contracts.01 The common law
mailbox theory is quite different from the receipt requirement generally
accepted by civil law countries and restated in the Vienna Convention.
0 2
97 Hague Convention Minutes No. 8 of Commission I: Intervention No. 21. The Chinese propo-
sal was adopted by a relatively wide margin: 28 delegates voted in favor of it, 8 delegates voted
against it, and 7 delegates abstained from voting. The Austrian delegate offered an amendment to
the Chinese proposal so that it would read: "The seller or his representative initiated the transaction
in that state and negotiations were conducted and the contract concluded in that state." Id. Minutes
No. 7: Intervention No. 67. This would, in effect, apply to cases where the seller entered the buyer's
legal sphere and took steps in the buyer's state, which would provide a fair balance between the
buyer's and the seller's laws. The Austrian amendment was not adopted in the final text of the
convention. Id. Minutes No. 8: Intervention No. 6.
98 Hague Convention Minutes No. 7: Intervention No. 67.
99 Id. Minutes No. 7: Intervention Nos. 55, 61, 64.
100 Id. Minutes No. 7: Intervention No. 53. Mr. Rebman, the Representative of the Federal
Republic of Germany, was very skeptical about the practical feasibility of the Chinese proposal. He
pointed out problems which would arise in deciding the place of negotiation or the place of conclu-
sion of the contract where a sales contract was written, telexed, or made by telephone. Mr. Rebman
concluded not only that these problems were without solution but also that the lex loci contractus
rule would produce erroneous results.
101 Id.
102 Lando, supra note 3; Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 24.
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The only way to overcome such uricertainty was to draft additional crite-
ria in Article 8(2)(a) by requiring conclusion of the contract in the pres-
ence of the parties. Such language means the contract only becomes
binding and effective when executed by and in the presence of the parties.
The compromise reached in the precise drafting seems to be essential for
the future success of the convention. As long as no unified system of
decision making on disputes arising in the course of international sales
contracts exists, and there are at least 185 national legal systems relying
on their own form of judicial settlement of disputes or different forms of
arbitration, this clear cut and relatively rigid drafting is the only way to
assure certainty in the movement toward effective universal unification of
the law of the international sale of goods.103
The delegates adopted by a wide margin the Chinese proposal estab-
lishing the exception to the application of the law of the seller's state.
This exception dictates application of the law of the buyer's state in in-
stances in which negotiations and the signing of the contract have taken
place in the buyer's state. If either one of these elements is missing, it
would not be possible to apply the law of the buyer's state.
The exception's narrow scope of application and restrictive drafting
explains the high level of consensus in its adoption.1 4 In the author's
assessment, this section is almost self-defeating in terms of practical ap-
plication because it disregards the realities of modern international trade.
It is not realistic to assume that both the negotiations and the signing of
the contract will take place in the buyer's state. Instead of relying on
these two rigid and mechanical connecting factors, it would have been
more practical to emphasize the relevant positions of the parties in the
initiation and negotiation of the transactions. 105 It is widely recognized
today that the place of contracting is often an irrelevant and fortuitous
occurrence and cannot provide a solid and predictable basis for choice of
law purposes. Thus, there is a definite probability that Article 8(2)(a)
will not play an effective role as an exception to the application of the law
of the seller's state in international sales contracts.
The second exception to the application of the law of the seller's
103 2 E. RABEL, supra note 25, at 455-58; see also A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 31, at 45.
104 Hague Convention Minutes No. 8.
105 FIRsT RESTATEMENT, supra note 28, § 332. Exclusive reliance on rigid connecting factors
such as the lex loci contractus has been strongly criticized by the weight of authority in both com-
mon law and civil law countries. The Second Restatement § 188, clearly abandoned the application
of mechanical choice of law rules. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 64, § 188. The same trend
can be observed in more recent national codifications in civil law countries and in regional codifica-
tion of the Rome Contractual Obligations Convention. See also M. PELICHET, supra note 44, at 139-
47.
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state was submitted by the Algerian delegation. The original proposal
referred to the law of the state of principal residence of the buyer in
instances where the characteristic performance of the contract is under-
taken in that state pursuant to terms of the contract. Most of the dele-
gates found this proposal to be a vague and confusing choice of law
alternative which failed to reflect the practical realities of modern inter-
national trade. 106 First, the place of characteristic performance depends
on the use of Incoterms (universally-recognized shipping terms published
by the International Chamber of Commerce) which may point in several
directions and not necessarily to the place of residence of the buyer. Sec-
ond, determining the place of characteristic performance would require
an analysis and understanding of the rules of private international law of
the potential forum, thereby injecting additional uncertainty in the appli-
cation of this proposed exception. Third, several delegates objected to
the resurrection of the concept of the place of characteristic performance
as a reversal of the agreed-upon application of the law of the seller's state
and a return to application of the law of the buyer's state."0 7
The uncertainties inherent in the original Algerian proposal were
unacceptable to the majority of the delegates. After a lengthy debate, the
delegates reached an uneasy compromise by rewording the Algerian pro-
posal to refer to the place where the seller delivers the goods according to
the contract, instead of using the concept of the place of characteristic
performance undertaken in the buyer's state. 10 8 It is important to note
that most of the developing nations supported the final version of the
Algerian proposal, which was adopted by only one vote."0 9 While the
second exception to the application of the law of the seller's state can be
viewed as an attempt to restore the balance in the socioeconomic founda-
tion of international sales transactions, the exception frustrated the pur-
106 Rome Contractual Obligations Convention, supra note 10, art. 4. See also Hague Convention
Minutes No. 7 of Commission I: Intervention Nos. 13-18. Several delegates criticized the Algerian
proposal for misusing the concept of characteristic performance. This concept was utilized in the
Rome Contractual Obligations Convention leading precisely to the application of the law of the
seller, whereas the use of this criteria in the Algerian proposal led to the application of the law of the
buyer.
107 Hague Convention Minutes No. 7: Intervention Nos. 20-21. The Algerian delegate explained
that the place of characteristic performance should be taken to be the territory in which the goods
were delivered. Then the Chairman of the Commission recommended and the Algerian delegate
accepted the modification of the proposal stating: "The characteristic performance was to be ef-
fected to be the place where the seller delivered the goods according to the contract."
108 Hague Convention Minutes No. 7: Intervention No. 27. In the final vote on the modified
Algerian proposal seventeen delegates voted in favor of it, sixteen delegates voted against it, and
fourteen delegates abstained from voting.
109 Hague Convention Minutes No. 8: Interventions 46-68.
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pose of and considerably reduced the attractiveness and potential for
ratification of the Hague Draft Convention.
The most controversial provision of the Hague Draft Convention is
Article 8(3), which established a general escape clause from the applica-
tion of Articles 8(1) and 8(2). The section reads:
By way of exception, where, in the light of the circumstances as a whole, for
instance, any business relations between the parties, the contract is mani-
festly more closely connected with a law which is not the law which would
otherwise be applicable to the contract under paragraphs 1 or 2 of this Arti-
cle, the contract is governed by that other law. 110
Surprisingly, a type of superpower contest between the United States and
the Soviet Union emerged in the course of a lengthy and exciting debate
on the adoption of this general escape clause."'
The delegate for the United States emphasized that this general es-
cape provision was critical to the interests of the United States and that
the potential adoption of the convention by the United States depended
upon the inclusion of this clause.112 An alliance developed among the
common law nations in support of the general escape clause. These na-
tions felt strongly that their respective national heritages in dealing with
private international law questions required the injection of flexibility
into the convention's essential provisions. They also felt that by agreeing
to Articles 8(1) and 8(2), they had made extensive concessions to the
interests of developing countries by supporting the application of the law
of the buyer's state. The common law nations, therefore, felt entitled to
Article 8(3) as a compromise provision.
1 13
An alliance also emerged between the socialist countries, developing
nations, and several Western countries attempting to uphold their own
civil law traditions in dealing with questions of private international law.
The Soviet Union was the major proponent for the deletion of Article
110 Hague Draft Convention, supra note 10, at art. 8(3).
111 Id. Minutes No. 8: Intervention No. 66. Professor Reese, one of the delegates for the United
States, emphasized the significance of the adoption of art. 8, % 3. He stated that "although certainty
was important, justice was necessary too." Id. Therefore, the United States would find it far more
difficult to ratify the Convention if this provision were deleted. See also SECOND RESTATEMENT,
supra note 64, § 6 (referenced by §§ 188, 191) (while the place of delivery is the well-defined choice
of law rule governing the validity of a contract for the sale of an interest in a chattel, at the same time
the typical general escape clause can replace this rule if "to the particular issue, some other state has
a more significant relationship under the principles stated in § 6.") The flexibility of the United
States approach is obvious and it functions effectively within a coherent federal system. In the trans-
national legal environment, however, more certainty and predictability are needed.
112 Id. Minutes No. 8: Intervention No. 66. See also Jaffey, supra note 89, at 531-44; Blom,
Choice of Law Methods in the Private International Law of Contract, 18 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 171-92
(1980) (a comparative law overview of the common law approaches to choice of law in contracts).
113 Hague Convention Minutes No. 8: Intervention Nos. 49, 67-68.
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8(3). The Soviet delegate contended that Articles 8(1) and 8(2) covered
the most difficult situations in which the law of the seller's or the buyer's
state should apply and that the introduction of a general escape provision
in Article 8(3) would defeat that work and prevent unification. The deci-
sive issue, the Soviet delegate argued, was whether the convention would
be oriented toward the interests of the business community or toward the
courts and jurisprudential interests of different states. According to the
Soviet position, Article 8(3) focused on the interests of the business
community. 114
There was a recognition of the practical realities of international
trade reflected in the opposition to Article 8(3). This position took into
account risks of uncertainty regarding the law to be applied to a particu-
lar case until a court or arbitrator decided, "in the light of the circum-
stances of the whole," which law is the most appropriate. If certainty
and uniformity must be sacrificed in favor of flexibility, then the efficacy
of the unification of choice of law rules applicable to the international
sale of goods must be questioned, raising serious doubt about the future
ratification of the convention. 51 5 The Soviet delegate and delegates from
developing and civil law countries called for a reasonable compromise to
eliminate the inherent uncertainties reflected in Article 8(3).
After a lengthy debate, it became obvious that no feasible compro-
mise could be reached by redrafting Article 8(3). A vote was taken on
the possible deletion of the controversial escape clause. This proposal
failed by only two votes.' 16 At this point, opponents of the escape clause
attempted to reduce its scope of application by introducing a unilateral
reservation. Accordingly, Article 8(3) was deemed not to apply where
one party to a contract had a place of business in a state which had
adopted a reservation to the application of Article 8(3).' While the
Soviet delegate referred to this proposal as a good compromise, the
114 Id. Minutes No. 8: Interventions 49-54.
115 Id. Minutes No. 8: Intervention No. 68. The deletion of art. 8(3) was put to vote. Seventeen
delegates voted in favor of deletion of it, nineteen delegates voted against it, and five delegates ab-
stained from voting. See also 0. KAHN-FREUND, GENERAL PROBLEMS OF PRIVATE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 41 (1976) (a comprehensive study of sources of private international law as they relate
to the process of unification. The author recognizes the significance of international legislation in the
framework of the Hague Conference on Private International Law which should be connected with
authoritative judicial and arbitrational interpretation.).
116 Hague Convention Minutes No. 8: Intervention No. 68.
117 Hague Convention Minutes No. 9 of Commission I: Intervention No. 6. In his intervention,
Mr. Lebedev, the Soviet delegate, presented the unilateral reservation option as a good compromise
by providing that "paragraph three should not apply where one party to a contract had its place of
business in a state that had adopted a reservation on the application of paragraph three." Id. Fur-
ther, he noted that other delegates had asserted that 1 3 in practice would be applied only in excep-
tional circumstances under this compromise.
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United States delegate and other common law state delegates strongly
criticized and rejected it. They emphasized that this proposal would al-
low a state to avoid the operation of the escape clause against the will of
other states adopting it.II8 The delegates voted again, and the unilateral
reservation proposal failed by a margin of two votes.
In the final version of the Hague Draft Convention, Article 21 per-
mits reservations to avoid the application of Article 8(3) only if both con-
tracting parties have their places of business in a state which has made a
reservation to application of Article 8(3).119 Finally, the delegates
reached a compromise providing that the general escape clause of Article
8(3) does not apply if the contracting parties have their respective places
of business in different states, both of which are parties to the Vienna
Convention. 120
Undoubtedly, Article 8 can be considered the heart of the Hague
Draft Convention. The delegates reached a reasonable level of compro-
mise in drafting Articles 8(1) and 8(2). On the other hand, the drafting
history, the extensive debate, and the voting pattern of the general escape
clause in Article 8(3) disclosed the lack of real compromise and the near
fatal clash of legal and socioeconomic values of states represented at the
convention. The future success of the Hague Draft Convention will prob-
ably depend upon the effective interpretation of Article 8(3).
In the author's assessment, the most effective solution would have
been a more precise and specific drafting of the controversial escape
clause. In the decentralized, transnational legal environment, only
clearly defined fact-law patterns can set the foundation for legal security.
A comprehensive list of specific alternatives for the application of the
escape clause should have been incorporated.'21 Providing only one
vague example - the reference to the business relations between the par-
ties - was not satisfactory.
At the same time, it was not feasible to attempt to cover all of the
potential applications of this clause. Three step-by-step alternatives are
suggested to encourage uniform and predictable interpretation of Article
8(3). First, the travaux prdparatoire should be extended and published
with this provision. Second, an international court or arbitral tribunal
should be designated for the uniform and authoritative interpretation of
the Vienna Convention and the Hague Draft Convention. Third, a com-
118 Id. Minutes No. 9: Intervention No. 9.
119 Hague Draft Convention, supra note 6, art. 21(1)(b).
120 Hague Convention Minutes No. 8: Intervention Nos. 46-48; the final text is included in art.
8(5).
121 Hague Convention Minutes No. 8: Intervention Nos. 60-65.
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prehensive digest should be published covering the application of the Vi-
enna Convention and the Hague Draft Convention by national courts
and arbitral tribunals, including the potential fact-law patterns arising
under the escape clause.122 Reliance on these alternatives might lead to
genuine compromise and thus improve the number of future ratifications
of the Hague Draft Convention.
The well-recognized principle of validation plays a significant role in
determining the law applicable to the material and formal validity of in-
ternational sales transactions. This principle, reflected in Articles 10 and
11 of the convention, provides flexible and clearly defined solutions to
satisfy contracting parties' expectations for enforceable, valid interna-
tional sales contracts. 123 The material validity of the consent of the par-
ties is assessed in light of the parties' autonomy provided in Article 7.
Only if the choice is found invalid under Article 7 is reference to be made
to the general choice of law provisions outlined in Article 8.124 Here
again, a specific escape clause inserted in Article 10(3) states that "a
party may rely on the law of the state where he has his place of business,
if in the circumstances it is not reasonable to determine that issue under
the law specified in the preceding paragraphs."' 25 The circumstances
which will make it reasonable to rely on this exception for determining
the validity of consent at the conclusion of a sales contract will have to be
interpreted by future courts and arbitral tribunals.
Article 11 also offers a list of alternative steps for validating interna-
tional sales contracts and meeting the requirements of formality.' 26 The
contract will be treated as formally valid if it satisfies the requirements of
the convention or the law of the place where it was finally concluded or,
at least, the law of the state of one of the contracting parties.' 27  At the
same time, the contracting parties may rely on a reservation in Article
21(1)(c) by referring to the formal validity of their contract if one of the
122 Rome Contractual Obligations Convention, supra note 10, art.4(5). Rome Contractual Obli-
gations Convention art. 4(5) covers a comparable but slightly different and less-precisely drafted
escape clause. Providing "[p]aragraph 2 shall not apply if the characteristic performance cannot be
determined, and the presumptions in paragraph 2, 3 and 4 shall be disregarded if it appears from the
circumstances as a whole that the contract is more closely connected with another country." At the
same time, the protocol attached to the Rome Contractual Obligations Convention eventually will
provide a binding, authoritative interpretation function for the European Court of Justice which will
lead to a more uniform and predictable application of this escape clause.
123 Hague Convention Minutes No. 10 of Commission I: Intervention Nos. 3-96.
124 Id.
125 Hague Draft Convention, supra note 6, art. 10(3).
126 Hague Draft Convention, supra note 6, art. 11; cf. Rome Contractual Obligations Convention,
supra note 10, art. 9. Article 9 provides comparable alternatives for the implementation of the vali-
dation principle.
127 Hague Draft Convention, supra note 6, art. 11(5).
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parties at the time of the conclusion of the contract has its place of busi-
ness in a state which made this particular reservation.128 The effective
and flexible implementation of the validation principle in light of Articles
10 and 11 will enhance the attractiveness of the Hague Draft Convention
for merchants of the world.
D. The Scope of the Applicable Law
The drafting of Articles 12 and 13 which outline the scope of the
applicable law under the convention involved considerably less contro-
versy than the drafting of other articles. 129 At the outset, it is clear that
the modem notion of ddpegage is rejected. 13' Thus, all relevant issues
relating to the interpretation, the formal and substantive validity, and the
performance of international sales contracts shall be governed under one
substantive legal regime established under Articles 7, 8, or 9 of the
convention.
Article 12 provides a comprehensive list of legal issues which are
governed under the choice of law rules of the convention. The only con-
troversy arises from the problem of characterization of certain issues. For
instance, the problems of specific performance and damages are generally
treated as procedural questions in many common law jurisdictions and
are governed by the law of the forum. Overall, the civil law approach
prevailed, characterizing both damages and the areas of prescription and
statute of limitations as substantive matters and referring them to the
choice of law rules under the convention. 31  Article 13 makes a separate
128 Hague Convention Minutes No. 10: Intervention Nos. 98-121; Minutes No. 11 of Commission
I: Intervention No. 1-97.
129 Vitta, The Impact in Europe of the American "Conflicts Revolution," 30 AM. J. COMP. L. 9-18
(1982); see also Juenger, Trends in European Conflicts Law, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 969 (1975). While
under all of the modern United States approaches to choice of law, the ddpegage is the starting point
of the choice of law analysis, the prevailing civil law approaches generally reject the ddpaqage and
they prefer to treat legal relationships, particularly the contractual legal relationship, under the law
of one legal system without separating legal issues within the relationship.
130 Vitta, supra note 129.
131 Id. Prescription consistently treated as a substantive question in the practice of civil law
countries as reflected in the national codifications and in the framework of the Rome Contractual
Obligations Convention, supra note 10, art. 10(1)(d). At the same time, the traditional United States
approach treated the statute of limitation as a procedural question and there were only a limited
number of exceptions under the state's borrowing statutes and under the so-called specificity test.
Recently, a new tendency emerged which is treating the statute of limitations as a substantive legal
issue, and is analyzing it under the regular choice of law approaches of the particular forum. See
SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 64, § 142; American Law Institute's recent revisions provide
that with rare exceptions, the limitations period of the forum will be applied if shorter than the
alternative states. Iflonger, the forum statute will not be applied unless some distinct forum interest
will be served. See also Tomlin v. Boeing Co., 650 F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1981).
See also Hague Convention Minutes No. I1 of Commission I: Intervention Nos. 97-105; see
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provision for the law applicable to the problem of inspection of goods,
referring to the law of the place where inspection takes place as gov-
erning the mode and procedure for such inspection.132 This exception
was generally well received because of its practical approach in dealing
with details of one of the more essential elements of the performance of
international sales contracts.
The scope of the applicable law under the Hague Draft Convention
reflects a well-balanced compromise among the delegates. Dipeqage as a
modem phenomenon was clearly rejected. In the interstate conflict of
laws practice in the United States, dipeqage has become the starting
point for modern choice of law analysis. In the less secure and more
diversified transnational legal environment, the traditional jurisdiction
selecting choice of law rules enhance predictability and uniformity in the
choice of law analysis. 133 The convention follows the civil law tradition
of establishing the scope of the applicable law, which is comparable to
the approach taken by the Rome Contractual Obligations Convention.'
34
E. General Provisions
The general provisions of the Hague Draft Convention cover certain
relatively well-settled threshold issues in the choice of law process.
These provisions are relevant to the successful future application of the
convention by diverse national legal systems. The general provisions are
well-drafted and reflect the common understanding among the delegates
regarding the problems of the choice of law process. However, these pro-
visions do not cover all the relevant questions which judges or arbitrators
must decide in making a choice of law decision.
One of the more controversial problems of contemporary private in-
ternational law is the application of renvoi, a concept clearly rejected by
the convention in Article 15. That section provides that, "In the Con-
vention 'Law' means the law in force in a State other than its choice of
law rules."' 135 The wording of this provision involved a great deal of
discussion.136 The final text of this article properly refers to the substan-
tive internal law of the referenced national legal system under the rules of
the convention, while excluding the application of its choice of law rules.
The exclusion of renvoi was based on a general agreement that the con-
also Rome Contractual Obligations Convention, supra note 10, art. 10(2) (providing a comparable
solution).
132 Hague Convention Minutes No. 11: Intervention Nos. 97-105.
133 Hague Convention Minutes No. 18 of Commission I: Intervention Nos. 1-13.
134 Rome Contractual Obligations Convention, supra note 10, art. 10.
135 Ersi, General Provisions, in INT'L SALES, supra note 13, at 2-5 to 2-9.
136 Hague Convention Minutes No. 18 of Commission I: Intervention Nos. 23-27.
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troversial doctrine contributed more uncertainty and potential confusion
than uniform results and prevention of forum shopping. This is particu-
larly true in the area of international sales of goods where national choice
of law rules are so diverse that application of renvoi would not serve any
useful purpose.
Article 16 addresses one of the more significant threshold questions
of effective interpretation, a key to the future success of the convention.
Article 16 provides that, "[iln the interpretation of the Convention, re-
gard is to be had to its international character and to the need to promote
uniformity in its application." '137 In a decentralized transnational legal
environment, the decision makers in transnational conflicts disputes must
rely on this provision in order to escape their respective national heri-
tages and biases in interpreting transnational contracts. Thus, the em-
phasis is on recognizing the importance of the international character of
transactions and the objective of uniformity in the construction of the
convention. This guideline for interpretation nearly coincides with the
basic guidelines provided in Article 8 of the Vienna Convention.
138
The ordre public (public policy) defense recognized in the provisions
of Articles 17 and 18 has both negative and positive applications. The
law of a forum state may prevail if it reflects mandatory rules which must
be given immediate application despite the convention's reference to
other substantive laws. At the same time, the foreign law determined
under the convention rules may also be rejected if such law is manifestly
incompatible with the public policy of the forum state. 139 It has been
recognized that public policy should be used only as a last resort for
escaping the application of foreign substantive laws. The restrictive
scope of applying the public policy exception perhaps should have been
emphasized in the wording of the relevant provisions. The nature of the
two types of public policy defenses will only be revealed in future judicial
and arbitral application and interpretation of the convention.
140
One of the more complicated issues in the adoption of any multilat-
eral convention is the proper scope of the permissible reservations. In
the Hague Draft Convention, the drafters tried to reach a compromise
between the objectives of maximizing the number of states participating
in the convention and preserving the integrity and sovereign consent of
each participant. 141 As previously discussed, a limited number of reser-
137 Hague Draft Convention, supra note 6, art. 15.
138 Hague Convention Minutes No. 18 of Commission I: Intervention Nos. 23-27.
139 Hague Draft Convention, supra note 6, art. 16.
140 Id. Minutes No. 18: Intervention Nos. 54-57.
141 Id.
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vations were permitted to the more critical areas of the convention only
after great controversy, such as Articles 21(l)(a), 21(l)(b), 21(l)(c), and
21(1)(d).142 Reservations outside Article 21(1) are clearly prohibited by
Article 21(2).
While the general provisions cover some of the most important
threshold problems in the choice of law rules, they still do not touch
upon many other practical and significant questions. These include the
characterization or proof of foreign law, a problem which must be re-
solved under diverse national legal systems. 143 Yet, covering all the pos-
sible threshold questions would make the convention lengthy and would
endanger its clarity. Thus, it would be quite practical to establish a di-
gest for publication of relevant cases arising from future application of
the Hague Draft Convention and the Vienna Convention in order to
achieve a fair level of certainty and uniformity in this area."
F. Final Clauses
The scope of the application of the Hague Draft Convention and its
relationship to other relevant multilateral treaties was carefully drafted
in light of Articles 22 and 23.145 The drafters probably had in mind such
significant regional unifications of international contracts rules as the
Rome Contractual Obligations Convention and other future conventions
on the same topic. Yet, there is a specific reference to the fact that the
the Vienna Convention will not be affected by the Hague Draft Conven-
tion or by any other conventions relating to UNICTRAL.'46 Finally,
one of the more relevant final provisions of the convention is Article 28,
which provides that:
For each State Party to the Convention on the law applicable to interna-
tional sales of goods, done at The Hague on 15 June 1955, which has con-
sented to be bound by this Convention and for which this Convention is in
force, this Convention shall replace the said Convention of 1955.147
This closing article manifests a consensus by the parties to replace
the 1955 Hague Convention with the new convention. As stated earlier,
the 1955 Hague Convention, drafted by only one segment of the interna-
tional legal community, essentially reflected the understanding and the
interests of the developed countries of Western Europe and did not re-
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 50-78 (1982).
145 Hague Convention Minutes No. 18 of Commission I: Intervention Nos. 57-78.
146 Hague Convention Minutes No. I and 3 of Commission II, Hague Conference on Private
International Law, Extraordinary Session (Oct. 1985).
147 Hague Draft Convention, supra note 6, art. 28.
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ceive a wide reception by a majority of the countries.14 8 Finally, the par-
ties agreed that the Hague Draft Convention will enter into force after
the deposit of the fifth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval, or
accession to the convention. 149
V. FINAL REMARKS
It may be said without exaggeration that the revitalization of the
ancient lex mercatoria in the process of creating a new uniform commer-
cial code for world trade should be recognized as a major accomplish-
ment in this century. Effective unification of international commercial
law may only be accomplished on a worldwide basis. UNCITRAL pro-
vided the organizational framework to build bridges between the socio-
economic and jurisprudential diversity in the world community. One of
the most successful accomplishments of this legal process is the adoption
of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods. With the ratification of the United States, Italy, and the
People's Republic of China, the convention will be in full force on Janu-
ary 1, 1988. Having learned from the frustrating experiences of previous
attempts at unification, UNCITRAL focused on achieving a universal
level of unification. Unfortunately, this objective was not completely re-
alized in the Vienna Convention because of its reference to rules of pri-
vate international law.
As long as private international law rules are diverse and unsettled,
the effective extension of the application of the Vienna Convention can-
not be achieved. The United States, along with several other ratifying
countries, made a reservation to Article l(l)(b), excluding the applica-
tion of rules of private international law. Consequently, it became a criti-
cal goal for world trading nations to unify the rules of private
international law applicable to the international sale of goods. This ob-
jective was realized in the course of a unique joint conference with the
participation of UNCITRAL and the Hague Conference on Private In-
ternational Law. The Hague Draft Convention is a remarkable achieve-
ment reflecting sophisticated compromises between diverse
jurisprudential and socioeconomic views.
The scope and organization of the Hague Draft Convention at-
tempts to supplement the Vienna Convention and thereby achieve a more
universal degree of unification. Party autonomy was recognized as a ba-
sic principle in Article 7(l), giving effect to both express and implied
148 Id.
149 Id. art. 27(l).
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choices of law by the parties. This article expresses the drafters' strong
preference for choice of law by the parties in transnational sales con-
tracts. Neither "reasonable connection" nor "mandatory international
rules" limit the parties' autonomy. Thus, more flexibility and freedom is
provided the parties under the convention than under the UCC or the
Rome Contractual Obligations Convention, a factor which should not
impede the convention's potential adoption by the United States or coun-
tries of the European Economic Community. Only Articles 17 and 18 of
the convention relate to the application of the forum state's public policy
and establish a limitation on the parties' choice of law freedom.
The most controversial provision of the convention is Article 8 pro-
viding for the applicable law in the absence of the exercise of choice of
law by the parties. This article is premised on the comparative legal tra-
dition of the trading nations. Relying on the law of the place of seller's
business is not an innovation of the drafters. A large number of national
and international codifications of private international law have recog-
nized that the seller is the party faced with the more complex, less-pre-
cisely defined obligations in international sales transactions and therefore
should be able to rely on the certainty of the seller's own legal system.
Unfortunately, this relatively simple and certain choice of law solution
was not supported by the majority of the drafters of the convention.
Thus, the exceptions to applying the law of the seller's state are the most
controversial part of the convention. The exceptions shifting the balance
in favor of the buyer's state law received only marginal support from the
majority of delegates, indicating a lack of real compromise.
Inclusion of the general escape clause in Article 8(3) proved to be an
even more divisive issue. The common law tradition of relying upon ju-
dicial lawmaking and its resulting flexibility collided with the traditional
civil law preference for clearly defined choice of law rules. Again, close
voting patterns following extensive debate indicate a lack of real compro-
mise. In the author's assessment, the future success of the convention
depends upon the effective interpretation of its core provisions. An ideal
solution would be the creation of a protocol similar to the optional proto-
col of the Rome Contractual Obligations Convention including the
designation of an internationally-recognized judicial or arbitral authority
for consistent and binding interpretation of the convention. Another,
perhaps more feasible, solution might be the publication of a comprehen-
sive digest covering the application of both the Hague Draft Convention
and the Vienna Convention by national courts and arbitral tribunals.
Reliance on these approaches may lead to genuine compromise, thereby
promoting additional future ratifications of the Hague Draft Convention.
